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Abstract: The aim of  this paper is to investigate how efficient the performance of  the Malaysian banking
market is, using a data envelopment analysis approach, in the context of the increasing presence of
foreign banks. Specifically, two measures of  efficiency are constructed, cost and profit efficiency, by
utilizing bank-level data from Malaysian commercial banks, over the period from 2003 to 2014. The
results obtained show the domestic banks are more efficient than their foreign banking counterparts for
both measures of  efficiency. Next, the Lerner index approach was employed to measure competition
and finally, Granger causality tests were undertaken to answer the question, does competition foster
efficiency? The results of the causality tests support a positive effect of competition on the cost and profit
efficiency of  Malaysian banks. With regard to the financial liberalization, the findings imply that higher
competitive pressure may offset the market power of individual banks; however, eventually it will result
in efficiency gains for the Malaysian banks.
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Introduction
The presence of foreign banks in emerg-
ing markets and developing countries has in-
creased sharply, with market shares of  36
percent and 45 percent in 2009, up from 18
percent and 24 percent in 1995; foreign banks
play important roles in financial intermedia-
tion, with their average loan, deposit and
profit shares being between 42 percent and
50 percent (Claessens and Van Horen 2013).
The greater openness to foreign banks has at
times been motivated by a need to improve
the levels of competition and the banking
system’s efficiency and soundness; addition-
ally, the change in policy has also been trig-
gered by the need to reduce the costs of re-
structuring and recapitalizing banks in the
aftermath of  economic crises and the desire
to build a banking institutional structure that
is more robust to future economic shocks
(Lindgren et al. 1996).
In the same vein, Malaysia is opening
up its banking system to foreign investors as
part of  the country’s efforts to expedite its
integration into the so-called ASEAN Eco-
nomic Community (AEC) in 2015.1 The
ASEAN Economic Integration Plan, which
is based on the AEC Blueprint and ASEAN
Framework Agreement on Services (AFAS)
in particular, will facilitate financial liberal-
ization in the region. In April 2009, financial
liberalization was announced in the Malay-
sian banking market; foreign banks were now
allowed to own up to 70 percent equity (pre-
viously 49 percent) in investment banks, Is-
lamic banks, insurance companies, and
Takaful operators.2 As part of  the liberaliza-
tion package, seven new licenses were issued
to foreign banks, five new licenses were given
to conventional foreign banks with paid-up
capital of RM300 million, and two new li-
censes were given to mega Islamic banks with
paid-up capital of RM3.27 billion. In June
2010, a further five new licenses were given
to BNP Paribas SA (France), Mizuho Corpo-
rate Bank (Japan), National Bank of Abu
Dhabi (United Arab Emirates), PT Bank
Mandiri (Indonesia) and Sumitomo Mitsui
Banking Corporation (Japan). On this note,
the banking sector received a greater inflow
of foreign investment into the sector and the
foreign banks now dominate the domestic
banks in the Malaysian banking market. The
presence of more foreign banks in the mar-
ket will enhance banking competition, add
to the diversity of  the financial services in-
dustry and facilitate the transformation of  the
Malaysian economy to achieve developed
high-income economy status by 2020.
The presence of foreign banks in Ma-
laysia has increased steadily since the bank-
ing reform which was actuated by the eco-
nomic malaise at the end of 1997. The crisis
demonstrated the vulnerabilities of domes-
tic banking institutions; large numbers of frag-
ile commercial banks and finance companies
were revealed and the insolvency and finan-
cial distress were chaotic. The enforcement
of  Malaysia’s bank mergers resulted in the
1ASEAN which stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nation was established in August 1967 and the
initial members were Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore. The establishment of ASEAN was
motivated by three factors: to assuage intra-ASEAN tensions, to promote the socio-economic development of mem-
ber countries and to reduce the regional influence of external factors.
2 Takaful is defined as an Islamic insurance concept which refers to the management of  funds in the contract
between participants and the operator grounded in the rules and regulations of Shariah (Islamic law); the basic principles
behind Islamic banking are the sharing of profit and loss and the prohibition on the collection and payment of interest.
To put it simply, Islamic banking is also known as Shariah compliance banking.
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joining of all the domestic commercial banks
into several merged entities. Prior to the
merger announcement, the government’s
policy had been to allow market forces to dic-
tate mergers. Even with the government’s
efforts, the banking institutions were sluggish
in responding to the call for mergers. Table 1
illustrates the slow reduction in the number
of banking institutions during the period from
1980 through to 1999.
Table 1 shows that 71 banking institu-
tions, with 2,712 branches, operated in the
country in 1999. Between 1980 and 1999,
the number of domestic banks and merchant
banks remained relatively constant at 21 and
12, respectively. Malaysia was clearly over-
supplied with banks and this led to the inef-
ficient use of resources, and the duplication
of  resources and infrastructure in the domes-
tic market (Central Bank of Malaysia 1999).
The enforcement of bank mergers in 1999
reduced the number of domestic banks to ten,
while the number of foreign banks was left
untouched. The merger process continued in
2006 when Southern Bank was acquired by
another anchor bank, CIMB Bank. Another
voluntary merger took place in 2011 when
Hong Leong Bank acquired EON Bank; as a
result, there are only 8 domestic banks at
present, as compared with 19 commercial
banks owned by foreign stakeholders.3
Table 1. The Number of  Banking Institutions (1980 – 1999)
Note: a. All previous finance companies have been acquired by respective anchors (commercial banks).
b. All merchant banks have been converted or merged into investment banks.
c. On 4 March 1993, the Central Bank of Malaysia introduced an interest-free banking scheme, popularly known
as Islamic windows, which has allowed commercial banks to offer Islamic products side by side with two full-
fledged Malaysian Islamic banks: Bank Islam and Bank Muamalat.
Source: Central Bank of Malaysia (1999, 2015).
Banking Institutions 1980 1990 1999 2014 
Commercial Banks     
Domestic 21 22 21 8 
Foreign 17 16 13 19 
Finance Companiesa 47 45 25 - 
Merchant Banksb 12 12 12 13 
Islamic Banksc     
Domestic - 1 12 10 
Foreign - - 3 10 
Total 99 97 73 60 
 
3 It is interesting to note that merger fever has hit the Malaysian banking sector; a plan to merge three Malaysian
banks to create the biggest bank in Malaysia specifically and Southeast Asia in general was unveiled in 2014. The marriage
plan involves CIMB bank, RHB Capital and Malaysia Building Society with combined assets of RM613 billion (USD$188
billion); nevertheless, to date the plan still faces difficulties in arriving at a value-creating transaction for all stakeholders
(The Star Online 2015). Thus, most likely, the plan will not be implemented despite the Central Bank of  Malaysia
moving to create regional giant banks in realising the vision of the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015.
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Past studies into the role of foreign
banks are dominated by research in the ad-
vanced countries, particularly the United
States (US) and Europe, and to a lesser de-
gree in developing countries. Generally, for-
eign banks in developed countries are less
efficient than domestic banks; nevertheless,
banks from certain countries are more effi-
cient than their counterparts in other devel-
oped countries (Berger et al. 2000). Even
though the research in developing markets
lags far behind, the findings support the con-
tention that foreign banks in these countries
have succeeded in exploiting their compara-
tive advantages and show higher efficiency
than their domestically owned counterparts
(Isik and Hassan 2002; Grigorian and Manole
2002; Hasan and Marton 2003). Foreign
banks do not just follow their customers into
developing markets; rather, they are more
interested in exploiting local opportunities
(Clarke et al. 2001).
The proponents of foreign bank entry
argue that foreign banks benefit the domes-
tic banking market; the presence of foreign
banks is claimed to enhance competition in
the local banking market (Jeon et al. 2011)
and eventually improve the efficiency of do-
mestic banking operations and increase the
availability of credit (Claessens et al. 2001;
Clarke et al. 2001; Levy-Yeyati and Micco
2007; Yildirim and Philippatos 2007;
Claessens 2009; Olivero et al. 2009; Wu et
al. 2010). For instance, a cross-country study
shows that the presence of foreign bank has
been associated with lower profitability and
lower overhead expenses for the domestic
banks, and hence with enhanced domestic
banking efficiency (Claessens et al. 2001).
The penetration of foreign banks into the
domestic banking market increases the inflow
of available capital for domestic investments;
foreign banks contribute to the stability of
capital inflows by diversifying the funding
supply of domestic credit (Dages et al. 2000).
Other arguments in favor of foreign bank
entry into the local banking market include
improving risk management, transferring the
financial system’s supervision and supervi-
sory skills from the parent country, boosting
the efficiency of resources allocations, stabi-
lizing the domestic banking markets and miti-
gating the credit crunch and banking crises
in host countries (e.g. Crystal et al. 2002;
Claessens and Laeven 2005; Claessens and
van Horen 2013; Wu et al. 2010; Jeon et al.
2011).4
Opponents of the growing participation
of foreign banks in domestic markets are con-
cerned that the foreign banks might reverse
their capital and credit flows during a major
crisis in the host country; thus they would
not be able to provide sustainable funding to
the local market. Foreign-owned banks might
hamper the stability of the domestic banks’
credit through capital flight. If the parent
banks in their home countries suffer a credit
crunch or capital loss, the foreign banks can
contribute to any instability in the domestic
banking market by linking the domestic coun-
try with the cyclical fluctuations of the for-
eign country (Morgan and Strahan 2003).
Jeon and Wu (2014) offer evidence that for-
eign banks are a major channel for the trans-
mission of financial shocks, and pose a sig-
nificant challenge to the effectiveness of
monetary policy in the host economies. For-
eign banks may also cherry-pick the most re-
munerative domestic projects or high-qual-
ity borrowers; thus, the domestic banks may
4 Interested readers are referred to Claessens and van Horen (2013) for a comprehensive study, covering 1995-2009
and including 5,324 banks in 137 countries, on the impacts of foreign banks on domestic financial institutions.
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be forced to serve high-return clients. For-
eign banks also have limited information on
the creditworthiness of smaller borrowers in
local markets and tend to have higher inter-
est margins and profitability than domestic
banks. As a result, domestic banks become
unprofitable, inefficient and less competitive
(de la Torre et al. 2010; Moguillansky et al.
2004; Barajas et al. 2000). Other concerns
about the drawbacks of foreign banks’ pres-
ence are based on the idea that local finan-
cial institutions should be dominated and
controlled by domestic stakeholders that
serve the host countries’ interests (Dages et
al. 2000).
Based on the above mentioned studies,
the extant literature has focused on the im-
pacts, advantages, and drawbacks of the
growing role of foreign banks in local bank-
ing markets; nevertheless, to the best of this
author’s knowledge, no studies have investi-
gated the nexus between efficiency and
competition in a comparison between domes-
tic and foreign banks. Past studies such as
Havrylchyk (2006) reports evidence that for-
eign banks have achieved higher levels of
efficiency than domestic banks; however,
foreign banks that acquired domestic Polish
banks have not improved their efficiencies.
Foreign banks are also more efficient than
domestic banks in Latin America and the
Caribbean (Sáez-Fernández and Picazo-
Tadeo 2012). Claessen et al. (2002) suggests
that the increasing presence of foreign banks
leads to reductions in profitability and mar-
gins for domestic banks. In addition, Dages
et al. (2000) presents evidence of the contri-
bution of foreign-owned banks to greater sta-
bility of credit and improved financial sys-
tems in Argentina and Mexico. Another
stream of  studies begs to differ; Wezel 2010
discovers that foreign banks in Central
America are not necessarily more efficient
than their domestic counterparts. Saif  and
Yassen (2005) also find that the performance
efficiency of foreign banks is no different to
that of the domestic banks in the Middle East
and North Africa (MENA) region. In a cross-
country analysis, Lensik et al. (2008) con-
firms the argument of  opponents, that for-
eign banks negatively affect banking effi-
ciency; Liao (2010) also expresses similar
support for the contention.
As far as this study is concerned, there
has been no attempt at all to assess the nexus
between efficiency and competition in the
context of the foreign banks and their do-
mestic counterparts in the Malaysian bank-
ing system. Detragiache and Gupta (2004)
report that foreign banks appear to perform
better than domestic banks during a finan-
cial crisis, in terms of  their capitalization,
profitability and interest margin, and worse
in terms of  overhead expenses. Matthew and
Mahadzir Ismail (2006) find that the main
source of productivity growth in Malaysian
banking is technical change, and foreign
banks are more efficient than domestic banks
in this respect. The contention that foreign
banks are more efficient than domestic banks
is also supported in Onget al. (2011). Their
findings indicate that foreign banks are more
efficient than domestic banks with respect to
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) utilization
and profit generation. Mohd-Tahiret al.
(2010) suggests that domestic banks are less
profit efficient than foreign banks. Most of
these previous studies have reported that for-
eign banks are more efficient than domestic
banks. Therefore, this study seeks to fill this
gap in the literature by providing evidence
regarding the efficiency and competition
nexus of the Malaysian banking industry
through a comparison between the foreign
banks and their domestic counterparts.
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The rest of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section offers a brief  dis-
cussion of the literature review of the nexus
between competition and efficiency in the
banking sector, followed by a section describ-
ing the data and the methodology. The re-
sults and discussion section presents the re-
sults of  the market structure and competi-
tion, as well as the nexus between the vari-
ous measures of efficiency and banking com-
petition. The article ends with the conclusion.
Literature Review
Basically, two strands of  literature on
the efficiency-competition link in banking
exist: One that involves the structural ap-
proach and the other that involves the non-
structural approach. Both structure-conduct-
performance and efficient-structure theories,
which form the structural approach, postu-
late that market concentration determines the
competitive conduct of  firms in a market. The
rationale behind the link between market
competition and efficiency originates from
the ‘Quiet Life Hypothesis’ (QLH), which the
great Hicks states as “The best of all mo-
nopoly profits is a quiet life” (Hicks 1935, p.
35). The hypothesis suggests that there is less
pressure to compete in concentrated markets,
which results in reduced efforts by managers
to operate efficiently. Therefore, an increased
market concentration weakens market com-
petition and hampers productive efficiency.
The QLH also constitutes the ‘Structure Con-
duct Performance’ (SCP) hypothesis as pro-
posed by Bain (1951). This hypothesis advo-
cates that banks in a concentrated market
impose higher loan rates and lower deposit
rates, generating more profits and reducing
collusion costs, and as a result, competition
declines. Basically, the SCP paradigm suggests
that markets which are dominated by a few
large firms (highly concentrated) are less com-
petitive than markets which are less concen-
trated (Mason 1939); an increase in market
concentration is associated with higher prices
and greater profits (Bain 1951). In contrast,
the ‘Efficient Structure Hypothesis’ (ESH)
infers that the degree of concentration is de-
termined by the superior performance of  the
efficient banks. The hypothesis postulates
that firms with superior efficiency become
more profitable and thus will increase their
market share; as a result, competition declines
(Demsetz 1973; Peltzman 1977). Firms may
be exploiting greater x-efficiency or greater
scale efficiency (Berger 1995); therefore,
more efficient firms implies  that they have
lower costs which enables them to capture a
larger market share, resulting in a higher mar-
ket concentration.
The second approach, the non-struc-
tural approach, suggests that no clear evi-
dence  exists showing that in more concen-
trated markets the market power is higher and
competition is lower. The contestable mar-
ket theory emphasizes that a high concentra-
tion market can be highly competitive even
if  it is dominated by only a few firms (Baumol
1982). In addition, Liebenstein (1966) argues
that competition can reduce x-inefficiencies.
This approach does not infer the competitive
conduct of  banks based on the market struc-
ture; the new industrial organization approach
claims that banks behave differently depend-
ing on the market structure in which they
operate.
Another stream of studies regresses the
efficiency scores over the non-structural mea-
sures of  the Panzar-Rosse approach. For in-
stance, Weill (2004) incorporates efficiency
scores (measured by a stochastic frontier
method) and a set of independent variables
(Gross Domestic Product {GDP} per capita,
density of  demand, intermediation ratio and
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geographic location) against the regression of
the competition variable. That study found a
negative relationship between competition
and efficiency in the European Union (EU)
banking market. This is supported by Casu
and Girardone (2006), who measured com-
petition by the Panzar-Rosse approach where
data development analysis was employed to
estimate efficiency scores. The study offers
evidence of a negative relationship between
efficiency and competition in the EU bank-
ing market (1997-2003). In a study of the
South African banking market, Mlambo and
Ncube 2011 find that the South African bank-
ing sector is characterized by a monopolistic
competition market structure, while there is
an increasing trend in banking efficiency for
1999-2008. In contrast to Casu and Girardone
(2006), the authors propose a positive rela-
tionship between efficiency and competition
in the South African banking market.
Empirical studies that test the running
causality between efficiency and competition
are scarce. The most notable study is Casu
and Girardone (2009), which reveals the cau-
sality relationship by employing Granger cau-
sality tests. That study found a negative rela-
tionship between efficiency and competition
in selected EU countries (France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) in
2000-2005. The authors find a positive cau-
sation between market power and efficiency,
whereas the causality running from efficiency
to competition is weak. Next, Pruteanu-
Podpiera et al. (2008) investigated the effects
of banking competition on efficiency mea-
sures in the Czech Republic between 1994
and 2005. That study rules out competition
improvements over the study period. The re-
sults offer support for a negative relationship
between cost efficiency scores and banking
competition; thus, the ‘quiet life’ hypothesis
is rejected. Maudos and Fernándezde
Guevara (2007) analyzed the relationship
between market power and efficiency in the
EU countries from 1993 to 2002. They re-
gressed market power variables, represented
by the Lerner index and Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index (HHI) and other explana-
tory variables (size of banks and types of
banking specialization), on the dependent
variable, which was the cost efficiency vari-
able. The results of the study reject the ‘quiet
life’ hypothesis in the European banking sys-
tem.
By pointing out the gap in the literature
regarding the link between competition and
bank soundness, Schaek and Cinak (2008)
employed efficiency measures as the possible
transmission mechanism by which higher
competition contributed to increased bank
soundness in European and US markets in
1995-2005. Employing the Lerner index as
the measure of competition and cost and
profit efficiency, which are measured by the
stochastic frontier method, the study applied
Granger causality tests to examine the link
between competition and efficiencies. The
negative running causality from cost effi-
ciency to competition is confirmed in both
markets. However, the running causality of
‘competition-cost efficiency’ yields different
signs, a positive link in the US, but the re-
verse recorded in the European market. That
study offers support for the pro-competition
policies by suggesting that competitive banks
are able to allocate resources more efficiently
to bank customers. The testimony is con-
firmed further in the study by Koetter et al.
(2008) of the US banking market between
1986 and 2005.
This study contributes to the literature
by extending the analysis of the relationship
between efficiency and competition to devel-
oping countries, specifically the Malaysian
banking market. This is the first empirical
Ab. Rahim
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study to test the relationship between effi-
ciency and competition in the Malaysian
banking industry.
Methods
Input and Output Variables
The definition and measurement of in-
puts and outputs in the banking function re-
mains a contentious issue among research-
ers.5 There is a long-standing dispute over
what banks produce and what resources
banks consume (Berger and Humphrey 1992).
With regard to this, there are two main ap-
proaches in the banking theory literature,
namely the production and intermediation
approaches (Klein 1971; Monti 1972; Sealey
and Lindley 1977). As the purpose of this
study is to evaluate the efficiency of banks,
with banks acting as financial intermediar-
ies, this study employs the intermediation
approach, like many studies into banking ef-
ficiency (such as Omar, Abd-Majid and
Rulindo, 2007; Sufian and Abd-Majid, 2007;
Abd-Majid and Maulana, 2012 among all). It
is also more relevant for financial institutions,
as the cost of  funds to be intermediated (in-
terest expenses) often accounts for one-half
to two-thirds of their total costs (Berger and
Humphrey 1997). This approach is also su-
perior at evaluating the importance of fron-
tier efficiency, as the minimization of  total
cost (besides production cost) is needed to
maximize profits.
The input variables chosen are person-
nel expenses, fixed assets, deposits and short
term funding (deposits), whereas the output
variables are represented by total loans and
total securities. Subsequently, the intermedia-
tion approach is maintained in the estimation
of competition in the Malaysian banking sec-
tor. The input prices employed are calculated
as the price of labor (total expenditure on
employees such as salaries, employee benefits
and reserves for retirement pay, divided by
total assets); the price of capital (the ratio of
non-interest expenses to the book value of
premises and fixed assets) and the price of
deposits (total interest expenses divided by
total deposits and short-term funding), while
the output prices are proxied by the ratio of
total income and total loans and advances
(price of loans) and the ratio of non-interest
income and total securities (price of securi-
ties).
This study covers 21 Malaysian com-
mercial banks over the period from 2003 to
2014; including all the domestic banks,
namely: Affin Bank, Alliance Bank, AMBank,
CIMB Bank, Hong Leong Bank, Maybank,
Public Bank and RHB Bank and 13 foreign
banks: Bangkok Bank, Bank of America,
Bank of  China, Bank of  Tokyo-Mitshubishi,
Citibank, Deustche Bank, Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) Bank,
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, Oversea-Chinese
Banking Corporation (OCBC) Bank, Stan-
dard Chartered Bank, the Bank of Nova
Scotia, the Royal Bank of Scotland and
United Overseas Bank.6 The bank level data
used are taken from the BankScope 2000
spreadsheets published by Bureau Van Dijk
(BVD). All the financial variables reported
5 Interested readers are referred to Berger and Mester (2003) for a competent treatment of the definitions and
measurement of the concepts of bank inputs and outputs.
6 Six foreign commercial banks are not included in this study as the respective banks were established quite later on
in the study period. For instance, five banks namely: BNP Paribas SA (France); Mizuho Corporate Bank (Japan);
National Bank of Abu Dhabi (United Arab of Emirates); Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and Sumitomo
Mitsui Banking Corporation (Japan) were set up in 2010 while another bank, India International Bank was just
established in 2011.
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are in nominal values (Ringgit Malaysia), to
facilitate comparison over time, and all the
variables are deflated by the Consumer Price
Index (hereafter denoted as CPI) to obtain
real values at the 2010 price constant.7
Measuring Efficiency
The main nonparametric method, Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA), was intro-
duced by Charneset et al. (1978) and it is an
analytical tool used to measure the relative
efficiency of  firms throughout the process of
transforming inputs into outputs. The effi-
ciency score is obtained by taking the maxi-
mum ratio of weighted outputs to weighted
inputs. This measurement allows multiple
outputs and inputs to be reduced to a single
‘virtual’ input (x
i
) and a single ’virtual’ out-
put (y
i
) by optimal weighs. This study utilizes
the variable returns to scale model (Banker
et al. 1984) as in practice firms may face ei-
ther economies or diseconomies of scale.
Additionally, the input-oriented DEA is em-
ployed in this study as the domestic commer-
cial banks dwell well on the sources of input
waste (Isik and Hasan 2003). There exist N
firms (i = 1, …, N) that produce a vector of
q outputs y
i
 = (y
i
, …, y
iq
) that they sell at prices
r
i
 = (r
i1
, …, r
iq
) using a vector of p inputs x
i
 =
(x
i1
, …, x
ip
) for which they pay prices w
i
 =
(w
i1
, …, w
ip
). To account for cost efficiency,
the vector of input prices w
i
 is inserted into
the equation; the cost efficiency for the case
of  firm j can be calculated by solving the fol-
lowing linear programming:
   ..................... (1)
where     is the cost minimizing vector of the
input quantities for the jth DMU, given the
input prices w
i 
and the output levels y
i
 are
obtained from a linear combination of  firms
that produce at least as much of each of the
outputs using the same or less amount of in-
puts. Having obtained the solution to the
problem, the cost efficiency of  firm j is cal-
culated as:
................... (2)
where CEj  1 represents the ratio between
the minimum costs associated with the use
of the input vector that minimizes costs and
the observed costs for firm j.
Similarly to cost efficiency, the calcula-
tion of standard profit efficiency can be done,
for the case of  firm j, by solving the follow-
ing problem of linear programming proposed
by Chung et al. (1997). This solution is ob-
tained from a linear combination of  firms that
produce at least as much of each of the out-
puts using the same or less amounts of in-
puts. If  this hypothetical firm is subject to
the same input and output prices as those
faced by firm j it would have a profit:
   ......(3)
 .  .        
 
     ≥           ∀   
              
 
     
    =  
  
∗
  
=  
∑         
∗
∑         
 
              
 
    −       
 
     
 .  .        
 
     ≥           ∀   
7 CPI is preferred for use as the deflator in many studies such as Dogan and Fausten (2003) and Detragiache and
Gupta (2004). Okuda and Hashimoto (2004) stated that when using panel data, it is necessary to use a deflator in order
to keep outputs from various years comparable.
    
 
     ≤           ∀   
    
 
= 1;     ≥ 0;        = 1, … ,   
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which corresponds to the vector of outputs
and the input demand vector  that maximizes
the profits with the given prices of outputs r
and inputs w. This solution is obtained from
a linear combination of  firms that produce
at least as much of each of the outputs using
the same or less amounts of inputs; thus, it
would have a profit  which will be higher than
or equal to that of  firm j.
Having solved the above problem, the
standard profit efficiency for firm j is then
calculated as follows:
.........(4)
where PE
j
 represents the ratio between the
observed profits P
j
 and the maximum profits
associated with the production of the output
vector  and with demand for inputs  that
maximize profits for firm j.
Measuring Market Structure
To measure market share in an indus-
try, a market concentration ratio is used. CR
k
is computed as the sum of  the k largest firms’
market shares in the market, which takes the
form:
................................... (5)
Next, HHI is utilized to capture the gen-
eral features of  the market’s structure. HHI
refers to the sum of the squared market share
of all the banks in the market, where the
market shares are considered as weights. The
formula is given as follows:
.................................. (6)
where  is the sum of squared market shares
of  the ith firm, and n is the number of  firms
in the market.
Measuring Competition
To measure bank competition, this study
utilizes the Lerner index of monopoly power;
the index is a non-structural indicator of  the
degree of market competition. The compu-
tation of the index provides measures of com-
petition at the firm level, and the index has
been employed in several empirical studies
into banking competition (e.g. Angelini and
Cetorelli 2003; Maudos and Fernándezde
Guevara 2007; Fernándezde Guevara et al.
2005.). Basically, it is defined as the differ-
ence between price (calculated as the ratio
of total costs to total assets) and marginal
cost (expressed as a percentage of prices) di-
vided by price; it can be expressed mathemati-
cally as:
.........................(7)
where p
i  
is the price of the total assets of
production output Q, and is calculated as
total revenue (interest plus non-interest in-
come) divided by total assets. If  the Lerner
index is equal to zero; it indicates perfect
competition, so the firm has no market power,
while an index value of closer to one indi-
cates relatively weak price competition, and
thus the firm has market power. Addition-
ally, the Marginal Cost (MC) is obtained by
taking the first derivative of the translog cost
function with respect to output, as in Equa-
tion (10):
....................................................................................(8)
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  
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∑     .    
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To derive the marginal cost, a translog
cost function is adopted as it does not require
too many restrictive assumptions about the
nature of  the technology. The multi product
cost function for a given bank i at time t fol-
lows Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) as speci-
fied below:
  ..............................................................(9)
Total costs (TC)  of  banks are func-
tioned to output or total loans (y), the input
prices (w) which are P
L
 as the price of labor,
P
K  
as the price of physical capital and P
D
 as
the price of borrowed funds; whilst  = 1, 2,
…, 9 are the parameters to be estimated. v
it
 is
a two-side error term to capture the effects
of statistical noise, assumed to be indepen-
dently and identically normal, distributed
with zero mean and a variance 2
u
 and inde-
pendent of the u
st
. Standard symmetry restric-
tions of linear homogeneity in input prices
are imposed by normalizing total costs and
input prices with one input price (P
D
). The
symmetry condition requires
Empirical Models
This study employs a panel least-squares
regression using the Granger causality test to
assess the causality between bank competi-
tion and bank efficiency. A variable X
Granger causes variable Y if past values of
variable X should contain information that
helps predict or better explain the present
value of  variable Y. The Granger causality
test indicates that changes in one variable
precede changes in another variable of inter-
est. Inferences on causality is achieved by
running Wald tests on the coefficients of  the
lagged X and lagged Y in order to check
whether they are jointly statistically different
from zero (Casu and Girardone 2009). Fol-
lowing the framework of  Pruteanu-Podpiera
et al. (2008) and Casu and Girardone (2009),
using the Eviews 8.0 software, the panel data
model is used to assess the Granger causal
relationship between the efficiency and com-
petition of the banks as follows:
........ (10)
.........(11)
where i represents the individual bank and t
denotes time while 
j, 

j, 

i
 and 
i
 are the pa-
rameters to be estimated; while 
I 
stands for
the bank’s individual effect; 
it 
and 
it 
are er-
ror terms. The error terms in Equation (10)
and Equation (11) are assumed to be nor-
mally distributed with a mean of zero and
constant variance. Each dependent variable
is regressed on its yearly lags and on those of
the other variable.
ln      =   0 +      
2
  =1
        
+ 
1
2
       
2
 =1
              
2
  =1
 
+               
3
  =1
 
+ 
1
2
       
3
 =1
              
3
  =1
 
+         
3
  =1
               +      +    
2
  =1
 
    =      ∀  ,           =       ∀  ,  . 
Yit=     
n
j=1
 it-j  +     
n
j=1
xit-j  +   +      
xit=     
n
j=1
xit-j +     
 
j=1
yit-j  +   +      
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Variable Description Mean Median Minimum Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
All Banks:      
Inputs:      
Personnel expenses 137.23 71.53 1.22 1,181.20 208.23 
Fixed assets 82.56 40.14 0.20 718.09 116.93 
Total deposits 15,600.05 8,430.83 132.14 112,051.06 21,298.44 
Outputs:      
Loans and advances 11,204.03 5,657.85 8.56 91,257.92 16,414.90 
Securities portfolio  3,112.81 1,618.08 10.67 30,692.82 4,531.88 
Input Price:      
Price of labor 0.0097 0.0064 0.0013 0.3020 0.0294 
Price of capital 3.8513 1.9165 0.1814 35.3143 5.0467 
Price of deposits 0.0243 0.0237 0.0019 0.1006 0.0108 
Output Price:      
Price of loans 0.2363 0.0907 0.0326 5.5925 0.5725 
Price of securities 0.1326 0.0953 (0.5655) 2.6533 0.2072 
Domestic Banks:      
Inputs:      
Personnel expenses 285.71 183.79 41.13 1181.20 270.41 
Fixed assets 177.72 167.02 29.41 718.09 140.02 
Total deposits 32, 033.42 22, 755.78 3, 762.05 112, 051.06 26, 090.47 
Outputs:      
Loans and advances 23, 548.72 15, 986.86 2, 817.92 91, 257.92 20, 553.53 
Securities portfolio  6, 496.76 4, 555.00 572.37 3, 0692.82 5, 786.04 
Input Price:      
Price of labor 0.0157 0.0072 0.0013 0.3020 0.0471 
Price of capital 1.4547 1.4126 0.5022 3.2054 0.6142 
Price of deposits 0.0255 0.0255 0.0145 0.0389 0.0058 
Output Price:      
Price of loans 0.0877 0.0864 0.0534 0.1534 0.0159 
Price of securities 0.0870 0.0824 -0.1847 0.2347 0.0548 
Foreign Banks:      
Inputs:      
Personnel expenses 45.86 12.39 1.22 217.95 57.82 
Fixed assets 24.00 4.78 0.20 122.89 32.63 
Total deposits 5,487.21 1,500.95 132.14 29,131.70 6,868.57 
Outputs:      
Loans and advances 3,607.30 739.54 8.56 23,520.08 4,994.72 
Securities portfolio  1,030.38 384.67 10.67 4,168.99 1,132.47 
Input Price:      
Price of labor 0.0060 0.0059 0.0019 0.0112 0.0019 
Price of capital 5.3261 3.2508 0.1814 35.3143 5.9385 
Price of deposits 0.0235 0.0220 0.0019 0.1006 0.0129 
Output Price:      
Price of loans 0.3278 0.1005 0.0326 5.5925 0.7131 
Price of securities 0.1607 0.1084 -0.5655 2.6533 0.2561 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of  Input and Output Variables
Note: Price of inputs consist of price of labor (total expenditure on employees such as salaries, employee benefits and reserves
for retirement pay, divided by total assets); price of  capital (the ratio of  non-interest expenses to the book value of  premises and
fixed assets) and price of deposits (total interest expenses divided by total deposits and short-term funding); while output prices
are price of loan (the ratio of total income and total loans and advances) and price of securities (the ratio of non-interest income
and total securities).
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Result and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
This section presents the descriptive
statistics of  the input and output variables.
The input variables consist of the total per-
sonnel expenses, total fixed assets, and total
deposits, while the security portfolios, and
total loans and advances represent the out-
put variables. All the financial variables are
reported in RM values (Ringgit Malaysia), and
in order to facilitate a comparison over time,
the consumer price index is used to deflate
all the variables to obtain their values at the
2010 constant price. Table 2 shows the sum-
mary statistics of the input and output vari-
ables, which consists of the mean, the me-
dian, the minimum and maximum values, and
the standard deviations. The findings show
the output prices of Malaysian foreign banks
are higher than domestic banks. Interestingly,
the mean price of capital is found to be higher
among the foreign banks than their counter-
parts. The descriptive statistics show that
domestic banks dominate the foreign banks
in terms of  both the input and output vari-
ables. For instance, both the outputs for the
domestic banks are higher by 73 percent as
compared to the foreign banks, while the in-
puts are higher by 70 to 76 percent. The av-
erage total loans and advances for the domes-
tic banks are RM23,584 million, while the
foreign banks register total loans of RM3,607
million.
Empirical Results of Efficiency
Table 3 reports the mean efficiency
based on the averaging of the estimated effi-
 
Year 
Cost Efficiency Profit Efficiency 
All 
Banks 
Domestic Foreign All 
Banks 
Domestic Foreign 
2003 61.58 65.34 59.27 58.93 64.77 55.38 
2004 59.8 59.76 59.82 52.34 55.67 50.3 
2005 59.74 65.59 56.14 54.59 61.4 50.39 
2006 61.37 65.58 58.78 53.24 56.87 51.01 
2007 56.9 60.93 54.42 47.19 55.43 42.12 
2008 62.2 66.15 59.77 52.52 61.79 46.81 
2009 58.85 67.54 53.5 46.33 62.87 36.16 
2010 56.23 73.44 45.65 49.03 69.25 36.59 
2011 58.19 76.73 46.78 51.32 71.66 38.81 
2012 64.99 86.76 51.59 59.08 79.86 46.29 
2013 63.22 89.49 47.05 58.99 92.13 38.6 
2014 66.26 90.77 51.18 65.94 93.85 48.77 
Mean 60.74 72.34 53.66 54.13 68.80 45.10 
 
Table 3. Efficiency Scores of  the Common Frontier (2006-2014)
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Table 3. Efficiency Scores of  the Common Frontier (2006-2014)
ciency scores by the number of years of our
study period. Generally, the results indicate
that there is much room for improvement in
both types of  efficiency, and profit ineffi-
ciency is higher than cost inefficiency in the
Malaysian banking market. It is interesting to
point out that the cost efficiency gap between
the domestic and foreign banks is seen more
clearly than the profit efficiency.
The findings of this study contradict the
results of the previous studies on Malaysian
banks. Matthew and Mahadzir Ismail (2006)
and Ong et al. (2011) support the contention
that foreign banks are more efficient than do-
mestic banks; however the results of this
study suggest that throughout the study pe-
riod, the foreign banks exhibited a lower level
of  efficiency than the domestic banks. The
difference in the outcome could be due to
differences in the selection of our sample;
while the latter and the former covers the
periods from 1994 to 2000 and 2002 to 2009,
this study covers the period from 2003 to
2014. Nevertheless, when a comparison be-
tween bank and bank is made, this study tends
to offer support to the contention that the
foreign banks are more efficient than the do-
mestic banks.
It is noteworthy to point out the effi-
ciency performance of  the Malaysian banks
during the years 2004 and 2007; the figures
reveal the worst performance for both types
of  banks. A  decline of  2 percent and 9 per-
cent in cost and profit efficiency respectively
are registered in 2004; while in 2009, a de-
cline of 3.4 percent is recorded for cost effi-
ciency. Even though the overall profit effi-
ciency improves slightly by 1.1 percent in
2009, it is not reflected in the foreign banks’
performance, as the banks were worse off  by
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11 percent when compared to the previous
year. The efficiency performance of  the for-
eign banks declined in 2009, which could be
due to the immediate effects of the sub-prime
mortgage crisis in 2008. The largest perfor-
mance gap between both types of banks is
recorded in 2013; whereby the cost efficiency
performance of  the domestic banks is at 90
percent, while inefficiency scores for the for-
eign banks are found to be relatively high at
57 percent. In other words, on average; for-
eign banks waste about 57 percent of their
input to produce the desired outputs. Con-
trary to the aggregate efficiency scores as pre-
sented in Table 3, the findings in Table 4 and
Table 5 yield striking evidence; the results
reveal that for the efficiency performance for
each individual bank, the individual foreign
banks are more efficient than the individual
domestic banks.
From Table 8, the results indicate that
the Malaysian banking industry has been char-
acterized by a large asymmetry among the
banks, with their average cost efficiency
scores ranging between 7.73 percent (Tokyo-
Mitsubishi UJF Bank) and 100 percent
(AmBank, Maybank, Public Bank, Standard
Chartered Bank, Deustche Bank, the Nova
Scotia Bank, Bangkok Bank and Bank of
China) over the period from 2000 to 2011.8
The highest efficiency scores (100 percent)
are recorded in 2005 (Bank of China); 2007
(Deustche Bank); 2008 (Standard Chartered
Bank); and 2012 to 2014 (AmBank,
Maybank, Public Bank, the Nova Scotia
Bank, and Bangkok Bank) while the lowest
score (7.73 percent) is found in 2014. The
results further show that the domestic banks
are more cost efficient than the foreign banks
by 6 percent to 43 percent throughout the
period from 2003 to 2014; except for 2004
where both the foreign and domestic banks
are slightly indifferent in terms of  their cost
efficiency performance. Next, Table 5 illus-
trates the profit efficiency performance of  the
Malaysian commercial banks, and clearly the
results show that the domestic banks are
more profit efficient than the foreign banks
by a wide range of 5 percent to 54 percent.
Generally, the results of  the profit effi-
ciency of the Malaysian banks are mirrored
from the cost efficiency performance of  the
banks i.e. the largest performance gap be-
tween both groups of banks is found to be
more prominent in recent years. For instance,
in 2013, the profit efficiency scores of the
domestic banks (92 percent) is almost three
times the score of the foreign banks (39 per-
cent). However, in terms of  the cost effi-
ciency and profit efficiency performance of
the individual banks respectively; more of the
foreign banks are classified into the group of
efficient banks, as compared with the domes-
tic banks. As an example, the foreign banks
are found to be the most profit efficient banks
in 2003 (AmBank, Bangkok Bank, Bank of
America and Bank of China); 2004 (Bangkok
Bank, and Bank of China); 2005-2006 (Bank
of America and Bank of China); 2007
(Deustche Bank); 2008 (Standard Chartered
Bank); 2010 (Standard Chartered Bank); 2011
(Standard Chartered Bank, and the Nova
Scotia Bank); 2012 (AmBank, UOB Bank,
the Nova Scotia Bank, and Bangkok Bank);
2013 (AmBank, CIMB Bank, Hong Leong
Bank, Public Bank, and the Nova Scotia
Bank); and 2014 (AmBank, CIMB Bank,
Hong Leong Bank, Maybank, Public Bank,
UOB Bank, Deustche Bank, and the Nova
Scotia Bank).9
8 The banks in bold refer to the domestic Malaysian banks.
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Empirical Results of Competition
Basically, the results in Table 6 suggest
that a higher concentration leads to a lower
degree of market power; even though the
banking market is highly concentrated, it does
not lead to anti-competitive conduct. Follow-
ing the mixed results from the Lerner index
between 2007 and 2014; banking competi-
tion increased considerably from 2012 to
2014. Thus, one can observe the evolution
towards stronger banking competition during
the recent period. The banking competition
is at its highest value in 2014, when the
Lerner index recorded its lowest value, at
0.4344.
Empirical Results of Competition
and Efficiency
This section reports the empirical re-
sults of the Granger causality tests between
competition and efficiency presented in Table
7 and Table 8. These results are based on the
panel least squares and are White corrected
(White 1980). Competition, as represented by
the inverse measure of the Lerner index of
monopoly power, is regressed upon the lagged
cost or profit efficiency as well as the lagged
competition, and the results are presented in
Panel A; while Panel B reports the empirical
findings of  the reverse causality running from
competition to efficiency.
9 The banks in bold refer to the domestic Malaysian banks.
 
Year 
Concentration 
Ratios (CR2) 
Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index 
 
Lerner Index 
2003 0.4724 1177.45 0.5227 
2004 0.4840 1173.29 0.5215 
2005 0.4776 1132.63 0.5291 
2006 0.5111 1165.49 0.5554 
2007 0.5199 1178.90 0.5012 
2008 0.5223 1189.91 0.4549 
2009 0.5446 1239.58 0.4782 
2010 0.5386 1224.44 0.4639 
2011 0.5278 1258.15 0.5068 
2012 0.4949 1198.36 0.4669 
2013 0.5339 1338.67 0.4357 
2014 0.5394 1346.87 0.4344 
 
Table 6.  Concentration Ratios and Competition indices (2003-2014)
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PANEL A: Dependent variable – Cost Efficiency (CE) 
Model All Banks Domestic Banks Foreign Banks 
constant 0.2212* 0.0835 0.1015** 
CE (-1) 0.3163* 0.6627* 0.4871* 
CE (-2) 0.0981 0.0773 0.2680* 
 coefficients: 0.4144 0.74 0.7551 
Lerner (-1) -0.2303* -0.0252 -0.2539* 
Lerner (-2) 0.1428* 0.0289 0.1827** 
 coefficients: -0.0875 0.0037 -0.0712 
R-squared 0.5575 0.4619 0.4407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4745 0.4332 0.4228 
F-statistics 6.7198 16.0975 24.6315 
Prob (F-statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
PANEL B: Dependent variable – Lerner Index 
Model All banks Domestic banks Foreign Banks 
constant 0.0373 0.0835 -0.0241 
CE (-1) 0.0805 0.1372 -0.0106 
CE (-2) 0.2863* 0.1096 0.2082** 
 coefficients: 0.3668 0.2468 0.1976 
Lerner (-1) 0.4428* 1.1065 0.6019* 
Lerner (-2) 0.2352* 0.0389 0.2737* 
 coefficients: 0.678 1.1454 0.8756 
R-squared 0.7856 0.5905 0.6427 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7455 0.5686 0.6312 
F-statistics 19.5531 27.0407 56.2116 
Prob (F-statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 7. Granger-causality Tests - Lerner Index and Cost Efficiency
Note: *; ** - significant at 1 and 5 per cent significance level respectively
Ab. Rahim
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The results reported in Panel A, Table
7 may seem surprising at first glance, as a
positive link between cost efficiency and com-
petition seems more intuitive. The results
imply that cost efficient banks may have in-
creased their market power and caused a de-
crease in banking competition. The negative
efficiency-competition link seems to be con-
sistent with the efficient structure hypothesis
(Demsetz 1973; Peltzman 1977; and Smirlock
1985) and quiet-life hypothesis (Hicks 1935)
whereby efficient banks, with the most cost
efficient practices, tend to exploit their mar-
ket power. The results imply that efficient
banking systems are also the least competi-
tive, as the particular banks benefit from
economies of scale and achieve a higher de-
gree of  market power. Thus, a noncompeti-
tive banking market permits bank managers
to enjoy a quiet life where costs are not kept
under control. Similar results are reported by
Pruteanu-Podpeira et al. (2008) in the Czech
banking sector; Yildirim and Philippatos
(2006) and Koetter et al. (2008) for U.S.
banks; as well as several studies on the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) banking market, such as
Weill (2004), Maudos and de Guevara (2007),
Casu and Girardone (2006, 2009). Schaeck
and Cihak (2008) confirm the negative run-
ning causality from cost efficiency to compe-
tition within the European and U.S. banking
markets.
Panel B in Table 7 and Table 8 shows
the Lerner index negatively caused the bank-
ing efficiency, thereby indicating that com-
petition in a banking system yields positive
impacts to the efficiency performance of
banks. Increased competition would favor
banking efficiency, by providing incentives to
manager to cut costs, in order to remain prof-
itable. Theoretically, industrial organization
literature supports the notion that competi-
tion yields positive effects to efficiency. This
notion is further supported by the banking
literature, which mentions that efficient
banks have better screening and monitoring
procedures. As a result, bad loan problems
can be avoided (Berger and DeYoung 1997;
Williams 2004). The positive causality from
competition to efficiency lends support to the
quiet-life hypothesis (Hicks 1935), x-efficien-
cies hypothesis (Leibenstein 1966) and struc-
ture-conduct-performance hypothesis (Bain
1951). In the words of Grossman and Hart
(1983), under the setting of asymmetric in-
formation and uncertainty, competitive pres-
sures serve as the most effective instrument
in fostering productive efficiency. Thus, man-
agers have less incentive to manage the firm
efficiently in the case of low market compe-
tition, because the firm has the ability to gen-
erate sufficient profits to justify the manage-
ment. Koetter et al. (2008) supports the nega-
tive effect of  competition on efficiency, in
the context of cost efficiency and the posi-
tive effect in the case of  profit efficiency.
Interestingly, Panel A in Table 8 reports
otherwise, and this has led to a puzzle in the
context of the efficiency-competition nexus
among Malaysian commercial banks. The re-
sults indicate that an increase in profit effi-
ciency causes an increase in banking compe-
tition; hence, the positive link appears to be
due to the nature of the efficiency itself. This
implies that, despite being profit efficient,
Malaysian banks are not exploiting their mar-
ket power. The mixed evidence suggests that
policy makers need to be more selective in
promoting or pursuing policies that enhance
the efficiency’s performance, as it could re-
sult in a trade-off between efficiency and
competition.
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PANEL A: Dependent variable – Profit Efficiency (PE) 
Model All banks Domestic banks Foreign banks 
constant 0.1911* 0.1832 0.09105** 
PE (-1) 0.34754* 0.9323* 0.5629* 
PE (-2) -0.1321 0.1063 0.1076 
 coefficients: 0.21544 1.0386 0.6705 
Lerner (-1) -0.1827* -0.1509 -0.1519 
Lerner (-2) 0.1701** -0.1309 0.1222 
 coefficients: -0.0126 -0.2818 -0.0297 
R-squared 0.5306 0.6565 0.3509 
Adjusted R-squared 0.4427 0.6382 0.3301 
F-statistics 6.0311 35.8429 16.8952 
Prob (F-statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
PANEL B: Dependent variable – Lerner Index 
Model All banks Domestic banks Foreign banks 
constant 0.1006** -0.0740 0.0083 
PE (-1) -0.6441 -0.1734 -0.0756 
PE (-2) 0.3241* 0.1821 0.2467* 
 coefficients: -0.3200 0.0087 0.1711 
Lerner (-1) 0.4191* 0.9032* 0.5741 
Lerner (-2) 0.2349* 0.2121 0.2764 
 coefficients: 0.6540 1.1153 0.8505 
R-squared 0.7857 0.5941 0.6488 
Adjusted R-squared 0.7455 0.723 0.3305 
F-statistics 19.5588 27.4351 16.8951 
Prob (F-statistics) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Table 8. Granger-Causality Tests - Lerner Index and Profit Efficiency
Note: *; ** - significant at 1 and 5 per cent significance level respectively
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Conclusion
To sum up briefly, this study provides
evidence of the positive link between bank-
ing competition and banking efficiency in
developing countries by focusing on the Ma-
laysian banking industry. Theoretically, in-
tense competition compels firms to make
greater efforts in order to improve their effi-
ciency. With no or less competitive pressure,
firms prefer to enjoy a quiet life by taking
their customers for granted, and they lack the
proper incentives to increase their efficiency
and productivity. By ensuring only the most
competitive and innovative firms are able to
stay steadfast on the efficient production
frontier, competition improves consumer
welfare. Competition benefits customers, by
making firms more efficient, inducing firms
to compete via price, improve the quality of
their services and to innovate more. Never-
theless, the impact of competition depends
on many factors, such as the nature and struc-
ture of  the industry. The policies taken by
the authorities should be of a continual ba-
sis, the effects of government policies should
be allowed to be realized over the long term
in order to see the actual effects of banking
competition. Due to the flexibility over time,
both efficiencies can be improved in a longer
time period.
The results of this study offer cautions
to the authorities; they show that efficiency
and competition cannot be achieved with a
single policy directive. This study recom-
mends that the authorities should tackle the
issue by addressing policies based on a con-
tinual basis. In this vein, it is important for
the government to make continuous efforts,
and by persistently promoting competition in
the banking industry, the competitiveness of
the banking industry will result in higher effi-
ciency and better innovation that eventually
leads to a greater variety of products, lower
prices, higher consumer welfare, lower mar-
ket power and better access to financial prod-
ucts and services. Adding to that, a height-
ened sense of competition also would encour-
age the banks to identify new lending oppor-
tunities, while expanding their customer base
in order to generate income. By ensuring the
optimal competitive conditions in the Malay-
sian banking industry, the authorities can en-
sure that it will have positive results on the
performance of  the banks. For instance, strat-
egies to promote competition by reducing the
price of  financial services and products may
benefit the banking market (Fang et al. 2011).
Thus, the banking liberalization which is tak-
ing place in the Malaysian banking sector
seems timely, given the results of  this study.
The acceleration in the banking liberalization
has raised concerns about the increased con-
centration, and implications for the increased
market power. Nevertheless, it is important
to highlight that the relationship between
competition and efficiency is more complex
(Claessens and Leaven 2004).
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